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Subject: IP: ]domain name debacle
>Date: Fri, 16 Oct 1998 10:58:47 +0800
>To: Phil Agre <pagre@weber.ucsd.edu>
>From: Dave Crocker <dcrocker@brandenburg.com>
>Subject: Re: [RRE]domain name debacle
>Cc: "Red Rock Eater News Service" <rre@lists.gseis.ucla.edu>
>
>Phil,
>
>I strongly concur that the transition to remove US government's role in
>funding Internet administration has been badly mishandled. The nature of
>that mishandling, however, is quite different from that contained in the
>analysis offered by Professor Meuller.
>
>One example of the difference is in the Subject line that you chose to use
>for distributing his article. You correctly imply that the current
>situation pertains to an effort to make changes in the Domain Name Service,
>yet we now find ourselves waiting for a major change in IANA, itself. This
>is the result of a superbly executed strategy by those seeking delay in
>Domain Name Service changes. The gTLD MoU was in the process of being
>implemented, yet those seeking delay managed to convince the White House
>(Magaziner) to expand the scope of the discussion to be IANA's operation.
>
>Hence, the single most serious problem with the US government's desire to
>extricate itself from Internet administration is that its effort at
>extrication has involved considerably more INTERVENTION than has occurred in
>the past. In fact, IANA operation has been largely "privatized" for most of
>its more-than 10 year existence. The US government's role has largely been
>one of funding and not control, and that funding has pertained only to a
>tiny portion of the overall administrative structure. Further, IANA, has
>derived its real authority from the broad Internet community and not from
>the US government. Those directly involved in Internet Technology,
>Operations and Administration (ITOA) are quite clear about this point,
>unlike those with little experience in the matter, for whom this has been an
>interesting -- albeit abstract -- academic or political exercise.
>
>The failure to understand or acknowledge the real basis for IANA's authority
>is the fatal flaw in the US government's position and the actions that
>derive from it.
>
>Some additional difficulties with Professor Mueller's analysis:
>
>At 05:44 PM 10/15/98 -0700, Phil Agre wrote:
>> "What I would say if I were testifying today in DC"
>> Before the House Committee on Basic Research
>>
>> Dr. Milton Mueller <mueller@syr.edu>
>
>>... There is, in fact, no
>>pre-existing "private sector" in Internet address allocation or domain
>>name root server operation to regulate itself; these processes have
>
>All of us in the private sector who have domain names and IP addresses will,
>no doubt, be surprised to hear that there is no private sector for them.
>Further, the IP address administration structure is widely held to be an
>extremely good example of self-organization and operation, all done from the
>community rather than government. If this isn't "private sector" then
what is?
>
>Domain Name root server operation has also been an (almost) entirely
>community affair. Although often characterized as "suffering" from being
>"only" a volunteer effort, the operators of the different DNS root servers
>are all experienced professionals within substantial Internet organizations.
> In fact, only NSI has root server operation as a line-item in its budget.
>Again, if this isn't community, or grass-roots, or private, then what is?
>(We need to be careful not o be distracted by the fact that some of the
>server operators work for government agencies; this activity by them is not
>a result of that association but, rather, their professional commitment to
>Internet operation.)
>
>Domain Name registration has not fared so well, and this is primarily due to
>errors by the US government. When moving from direct US government funding,
>to user fees, for "generic" names registration by NSI, the US government
>granted a for-profit entity a monopoly position with a guaranteed revenue
>stream, permitting a fee that is as much as seven times higher than
>appropriate for "reasonable" profits. This created two major problems at
>once. One is that NSI, itself, instantly acquired a massive funding base to
>use for protecting its position. The second is that it created a very
>strong incentive for others seeking to corner names so that they, too, could
>garner excessive profits.
>
>Although the International Trademark Association (INTA) participated in the
>development of a "multi-faction" compromise proposal, embodied by the gTLD
>MoU, and supported its implementation, some trademark holders decided to
>seek further delays, in the fear that additional names will mean a more
>difficult time "policing" the enforcement of their trademarked names.
>
>These are powerful forces to align against progress and they have been quite
>successful.
>
>To the detriment of end users.
>
>After more than four years, end users still do not have access to additional
>names and still do not have access to alternative registration agents for
>gTLDs. As one or another person claims to speak for users, we all need to
>note that ultimately, the focus has been on benefits for (a rather small
>number of) for-profit corporations, rather than benefits for users.
>
>>The inapplicability of the "industry self-regulation" model is
>>apparent at a glance. The two biggest players in the White Paper
>>process have been Jon Postel's IANA, the DARPA contractor that
>>controls address assignments, and Network Solutions Inc. (NSI), the
>
>It has recently come into vogue to claim that NSI and IANA are equal. This
>isn't merely wrong, it is silly.
>
>NSI is making roughly US$ 50,000,000 per year of profit. (Claims to the
>contrary rest on an analysis of NSI expenses for a poorly-run operation.)
>
>IANA's total budget is less than 1% of that.
>
>Further, IANA derives its authority from the Internet community and always
>has. It works with that community to develop its policies. Neither of
>these assertions apply to NSI, as most evidenced by its bizarre dispute
>policy (which gives more rights to trademark holders than holders have in
>any US court.)
>
>To compare a massively-funded for-profit monopoly with a tiny, community
>research team just plain makes no sense.
>
>>National Science Foundation contractor that controls the name space
>>and root servers. By abdicating responsibility for the transition to a
>>mythical "private sector," the White Paper in effect asked these two
>>organizations to define the terms of their own privatization. The
>
>Unfortunately, this is not the problem. The problem is that a) the White
>House suddenly took over control of an evolutionary process that had been
>working quite well without US government control, and b) gave the process
>highly unrealistic deadlines due to problems the US government has in its
>contract with NSI.
>
>>participation of private sector interests eventually degenerated into
>>a process by which various commercial interests lined up behind one of
>>these two government contractors. The parameters of the debate were
>>set by what was or was not acceptable to IANA or NSI.
>
>Professor Mueller has the order wrong. The alignments took place quite a
>bit before the scope of activity expanded to encompass IANA. They were
>created during the efforts to create competition and space expansion for
>gTLDs, as I noted above.
>
>>IANA in particular insisted upon defining the terms of the transition
>>in a way that maintained its own control. From day one, it developed
>>its own draft articles that located the organization in southern
>>California and was plainly meant to make the existing IANA staff the
>>core of the new organization. IANA did not put this draft before the
>
>This is a good example of the difference between a serious focus on
>operational stability of the net, versus a theoretically pure analysis
>starting from scratch. Pretty much everyone claims to want stability, so it
>is odd, indeed, to see a criticism of an effort to make the current changes
>occur as an evolution, rather than something more traumatic.
>
>>International Forum on the White Paper (IFWP) as a submission to be
>>considered and negotiated alongside others before the IFWP. Instead,
>>it set up its own, one-way process through which people could comment
>>on its proposals and it could, at its own discretion, decide whether
>>to use or ignore the suggestions. In order to develop support for its
>
>A one-way process would mean that the community did not have access to
>iterations of drafts and that no public debate (i.e., public pressure) about
>changes took place or had any effect. Since this is no what happened,
>Professor Mueller's use of the term is invalid.
>
>I suspect the problem is that there are many ways to conduct open processes,
>and the choice of process methodology needs to vary according to practical
>requirements of the situation. Professor Mueller's view that the IFWP
>process was, somehow, superior is countered by the fact that the IFWP
>process did not produce any draft specifications, much less iterations based
>on feedback. IANA's process did.
>
>To those who prefer the drafts produced by NSI, The Boston Group, or the
>ORSC, they need to look carefully at the processes used by those groups.
>They will discover that, in reality, they were the same as that used by
>IANA, minus the iterations based on public feedback.
>
>>own proposals, IANA leveraged its longstanding connections to the IETF
>>and to Internet administrators around the world, and drew upon the
>>political alliances that developed out of the ill-fated and notorious
>>gTLD-MoU. In the final stages of the IFWP process, IANA effectively
>
>"Notorious". What a detached, professional term. Very helpful to reasoned
>discussion.
>
>More importantly, Professor Mueller's assessment underscores exactly the
>difficulty that developed in this process. Those providing Internet
>technology, operation and administration (TIOA) services focused on
>continuity -- i.e., stability -- of the net. Others put the emphasis on
>politics and alliances.
>
>>destroyed any opportunity for a consensual compromise by refusing to
>>participate in a final negotiating session. One can only ask: by what
>>right does a government contractor set itself up as a
>>quasi-governmental authority with the power to hold proceedings on how
>>to privatize its own functions?
>
>Further this shows a logical error. On the one hand, Professor Mueller
>criticizes the formation of a ITOA coalition around IANA and on the other
>hand he asserts that IANA set itself up as the authority. One needs to be
>consistent, in this case by noting that IANA's authority does, in fact, come
>from the Internet TOA community.
>
>Hence, it is not just the effort of a government contractor but a far
>broader group.
>
>>NSI, for its part, did participate fully and openly in the IFWP
>>proceedings and did not adopt the unilateralist model of IANA. But in
>
>This is factually incorrect.
>
>NSI developed its own draft privately. It hired a supposedly independent
>consultant for this effort, although that consultant has yet to acknowledge
>publicly that relationship. This wasn't an "open" process by them at all.
>They went to IFWP meetings. So did IANA.
>
>So?
>
>>the final analysis, the IFWP process was inherently incapable of
>>resolving any of the outstanding issues involving NSI. This was true
>
>Indeed, why should an open, global process be expected to resolve problems
>between the US government and one of its contractors, especially when the
>problems were created by the US government directly?
>
>>simply because every serious issue about NSI revolved around the terms
>>of contracts between NSI and the US government. In the negotiation of
>>those contracts, IFWP simply had no standing. For this reason alone,
>>the "industry self-regulation" model made no sense.
>
>This appears to be a claim that the IFWP meetings had no effect on the IANA
>(or other?) draft specifications. Again this is factually incorrect.
>
>Lest anyone claim that my belief that the real game is, and has been, one of
>delay, I'll close with a bit of a recent Wall Street Journal article:
>
>>Date: Thu, 08 Oct 1998 11:46:42 -0500
>>
>>Network Solutions Has Lock On 'Dot-Com' Addresses
>>
>>By GLENN R. SIMPSON and JOHN SIMONS
>>...
>>>By this time, Wall Street had a clear view of what was best for Network
>>>Solutions: delay. The day the white paper was released, the company's stock
>>>price notched its largest-ever one-day dollar increase, jumping $6.75 a
>share,
>>>or 21%, to close at $39.25.
>...
>>>Wall Street doesn't seem worried about Network Solutions' future. Keith
>>>Benjamin, an analyst for BancBoston Robertson Stephens, said it will
take "as
>>>long as nine to 18 months" for rivals to vie effectively. "By that time,
>we believe
>>>NSI will have established an almost impenetrable brand," and will wind up
>with
>>>"a near monopoly."
>
>We should all ask whether any of this benefits the larger community,
>particularly users?
>
>d/
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Dave Crocker Tel: +60 (19) 3299 445
<mailto:dcrocker@brandenburg.com> Post Office Box 296, U.P.M.
Serdang, Selangor 43400 MALAYSIA
Brandenburg Consulting
<http://www.brandenburg.com> Tel: +1 (408) 246 8253
Fax: +1(408)246 8253 675 Spruce Dr., Sunnyvale, CA 94086 USA
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