IP: [do you sleep better now djf] essay: CRISIS DE-ESCALATION

[Dave Farber <farber@cis.upenn.edu>]

Please note neither JOCK NOR I ARE THE AUTHOR. djf
>Date: Mon, 29 Mar 1999 21:03:20 -0500
>From: Jock Gill <jgill@penfield-gill.com>
>To: Dave Farber <farber@cis.upenn.edu>
>
>
>Dave,
>
>This is longer than usual, but I would really like to know what the
>IP list thinks.  BTW, I am not the author.  It was sent without
>attribution.  None the less, I find the analysis and arguments in the
>essay to be both compelling and sobering.
>
>Regards,
>
>Jock
>
>CRISIS DE-ESCALATION
>
>ABSTRACT: Events in the former Yugoslavia have produced a
>deterioration in United States/Russian Federation relations which
>constitute the most real possibility of a generalized European war
>since 1945. This memo offers an assessment and a workable exit
>strategy for this crisis.
>
>HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: The ideological clash between Eastern and
>Western Europe has its roots in the theological schism between the
>Latin-Catholic West and the Greek-Orthodox East. Pan-Slavic,
>Eastern-Orthodox solidarity between Russia and Serbia must be viewed
>as absolute for at least the last 150 years. It is doubtful that the
>Russians can permit Ground Forces to attack the Serbians, and
>possibly, occupy Serbia without responding. Russian failure to take
>military action may well collapse the Yeltsin government, and lead to
>its replacement by either extreme rightwing nationalist elements, a
>de facto military government, or the reascension of the Communist
>Party to power.
>
>The historical significance of Kosovo lies at the heart of Serbian
>identity vis-a-vis their apocalyptic conflict with the Ottoman
>Turks.  The brutality of Serbian conduct in Kosovo in recent days is
>undeniable and at stake is a perception of NATO by the entire Muslim
>world which could have long-range implications for the West's
>relations with Islam as well as political reactions by NATO peoples
>revulsed by Serbian brutality.
>
>Nonetheless, the recognition of and eventual solution of the now de
>facto Kosovar-Albanian refugee problem must be subordinated to the
>more pressing need for active Russian participation and cooperation
>in any viable and stable regional state system. Current events
>threaten t he stability of Macedonia, Albania, and the still restive
>Croatia and Bosnia. But, the ultimate theater danger stems from the
>two NATO members, Greece and Turkey, who could be drawn into the
>conflict on opposite sides.
>
>Compensatory action must come before the Russians send volunteers,
>regular units or weapons to Serbia in defiance of the UN embargo
>against Serbia in an effort to create either a Vietnam-like quagmire
>for the US and NATO or to engage in a direct conflict using Russian
>forces. They are preparing to make this kind of military commitment
>as a token of Russian seriousness and regional importance, and as a
>signal to their own population of their still-potent military
>status.  Once military and political preparations have been placed on
>an actual war-footing, it is impossible to predict what might trigger
>generalized hostilities in any situation, much less the now fully
>inflamed Balkan Theater.
>
>CRISIS PROBLEM: Serbia is not the primary crisis; US-Russian
>relations are the main event.  The Serbs will fight to annihilation
>and pan-slavic [Russian] galvanization against NATO and the US is
>imminent and occurent as the bombing continues. Russian humiliation
>and loss of face over the last ten years has reached critical mass
>and has been sublated to a near war fervor.  Any clash -- repeat any
>-- with NATO or American forces will play further into the hands of
>the worst extreme rightwing elements in Russia. The NATO air assault
>on Serbia, following on the heels of the integration of Poland,
>Checkoslovakia, and Hungary into NATO, has further fueled an
>historical and emotional response which interacts synergistically
>with Russian strategic perceptions of genuine threats on their own
>borders and buffer states (Ukraine, Romania). The possibility of war
>with Russia is non-zero -- and could go theater nuclear.
>
>DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION: In six days since the bombing began,
>American-Russian relations have reached their most dangerous point of
>confrontation ever. An exit strategy for NATO and bridge building
>strategy for America and Russia must be implemented immediately.
>
>Any exit strategy must allow both sides to retreat from the precipice
>with honor and dignity and obtain multi-partisan support for a
>rational rapprochement in the principle countries [America and
>Russia], whose vital and improving good relations have been
>egregiously disrupted by the regrettable events in the Balkans since
>the break up of the former Yugoslavia.
>
>No vital American interest will be served by sending ground troops
>into Kosovo.
>
>EXIT STRATEGY: Immediate talks must be held with the Russian
>government on its highest levels.  The will of the American people as
>well as their vital interests are patently to assure good relations
>and future cooperation with the Russian Federation with respect to
>European peace and security as well as numerous areas of cultural,
>economic and scientific cooperation. The current policy is dangerous
>and untenable.  A new policy must be associated with new implementors
>who have the experience to deal with the Russians credibly. If the
>administration is to successfully signal a change of policy and
>disassociate itself from escalating collateral carnage in Serbia as
>well as the worsening and increasingly embittered state of Russian
>relations, it must send a new face to deal with a Russian perception
>of unparalleled affront to their historical sensibilities and their
>notions of current strategic necessity and danger. Arrangements with
>the IMF are an inadequate guarantor of stable relations between major
>powers whose vital strategic and political interests are perceived as
>gravely threatened.  Madeline Albright should resign to be replaced
>by James Baker, a seasoned hand with whom the Russians have had
>rapport and whose appointment will enhance bipartisan support in the
>US.
>
>Patently, the current policy has blundered into confrontation with a
>major threat which it had not foreseen. The new governments of
>Britain, France, and Germany are inexperienced. In seeking to assert
>an overly-localized view of European security, which fails to take
>into account relations between the US and the Russian Federation,
>these Governments have transformed a regional  peacemaking exercise
>into a major power confrontation and have rekindled many of the most
>dangerous impulses of the Cold War between these Great Powers. The
>damage inflicted on Serbia by Operation Allied Force approximates an
>appropriate punishment for Serbian brutality in Kosovo. The signal
>failure of the current State Department policy to apprehend and
>foresee the implications of its potential for major power
>confrontation necessitates a new Appointment. The new Appointment
>must retrieve lost ground and reverse Russian perceptions of
>increasing marginalization by NATO in their historical and current
>Sphere of Influence. It is as important for the new Appointment to
>reassure the Russians of our respect and desire for a Great Power
>relationship as it is to enlist their aid in solving the current
>crisis, indeed perhaps more so. The current crisis between the United
>States and the Russian Federation can be seen as a self-amplifying
>confrontation stemming from the initial failure of the US to have
>consulted Russia and coordinated action with Russia in a fashion
>consistent with Russia's image as a damaged but still Real World
>Power. If the widening chasm is not closed swiftly, even future US
>Administrations may be unable to avoid new and hostile threats and
>alliances, whose structure is currently unforeseeable, but which may
>run the gamut from a Red-Brown alliance in Russia to a Eurasian
>alliance between Moscow, Bejing, and others, either of which may pose
>a New Peer Threat and necessitate a full-scale Two-War Capability by
>the United States.
>
>SUMMARY CONCLUSION: The possibility of a genuinely unforeseen
>incident, which could spiral out of control into a general armed
>conflict directly between the United States and the Russian
>Federation, as well as some of the possibilities cited above, must be
>obviated by good sense, good faith, and sound statesmanship at this
>extremely dangerous crossroads in post-Cold War Relations between the
>two Great Powers.
>
>
>
>
>--
>____________________________________________________________________
>Jock Gill
>www.penfield-gill.com
>Infrared Internet Vision
>____________________________________________________________________
>