[Date Prev] | [Thread Prev] | [Thread Next] | [Date Next] -- [Date Index] | [Thread Index] | [interesting-people Home]
Subject: IP: Re: nsa
>X-Lotus-FromDomain: NAS >From: "Herb Lin" <HLin@nas.edu> >To: farber@cis.upenn.edu >Date: Fri, 4 Jun 1999 14:25:33 -0400 >Subject: Re: IP: nsa > >For IP > >The brouhaha over the "workfactor reduction field" that is built into Lotus >Notes is quite inappropriate. Ray Ozzie >gave a public talk on this aspect of Notes at RSA 96. The workfactor reduction >field was also written up in >the NRC report on crypto policy released in 1996 (Cryptography's Role in >Securing the Information Society, National Academy Press, 1996). Various people >may not like the policy decision embodied in that feature, which is their right, >but to call it a "secret" is grossly unfair. > >Herb Lin > > > > > > >Dave Farber <farber@cis.upenn.edu> on 05/11/99 02:25:11 PM > >Please respond to farber@cis.upenn.edu > >To: ip-sub-1@admin.listbox.com >cc: (bcc: Herb Lin) >Subject: IP: nsa > > > > > > > > >Spying on the Spies > > by Niall McKay > >WIRED 12:15 p.m. 10.May.99.PDT > > The National Security Agency has its ear to the world, > >but doesn't listen to everyone at once. > > > > That was one conclusion of a new report, Interception > > Capabilities 2000, accepted late last week by the > > European Parliament's Science and Technology Options > > Assessment Panel (STOA). > > > > The panel commissioned Duncan Campbell, a British > > investigative reporter, to prepare a report on > >Echelon, the US-led satellite surveillance network. > > > > "I have no objection to these systems monitoring > >serious criminals and terrorists," said Glyn Ford, a British Labour > > Party member of parliament and a committee member of > > STOA. "But what is missing here is accountability, > >clear guidelines as to who they can listen to, and in what > > circumstances these laws apply." > > > > Campbell was asked to investigate the system in the > > wake of charges made last year in the European > > Parliament that Echelon was being used to funnel > > European government and industry secrets into US > > hands. > > > > "What is new and important about this report is that it > > contains the first ever documentary evidence of the > > Echelon system," said Campbell. Campbell obtained the > > document from a source at Menwith Hill, the principal > >NSA communications monitoring station, located near > > Harrogate in northern England. > > > > The report details how intelligence agencies intercept > > Internet traffic and digital communications, and > >includes screen shots of traffic analysis from NSA computer > > systems. > > > > Interception Capabilities 2000 also provides an > >account of a previously unknown, secret international > >organization > > led by the FBI. According to Campbell, the "secret" > > organization, called ILETS (International Law > >Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar), is working on building > > backdoor wiretap capabilities into all forms of modern > > communications, including satellite communications > > systems. > > > > "[The report] is undoubtedly the most comprehensive > >look at Echelon to date because of its attention to detail -- [and] > > the NSA's use of technology," said John Young, a > >privacy activist in New York. > > > > Although the United States has never officially > > acknowledged Echelon's existence, dozens of > > investigative reports over the past decade have > >revealed a maze-like system that can intercept telephone, data, > > cellular, fax, and email transmissions sent anywhere in > > the world. > > > > Previously, Echelon computers were thought to be able > >to scan millions of telephone lines and faxes for keywords > > such as "bomb" and "terrorist." But Campbell's report > > maintains that the technologies to perform such a > >global dragnet do not exist. > > > > Instead, Campbell said that the system targets the > > communications networks of known diplomats, criminals, > > and industrialists of interest to the intelligence > >community. > > The report charges that popular software programs such > > as Lotus Notes and Web browsers include a "back door," > > through which the NSA can gain access to an > >individual's personal information. > > > > Citing a November 1997 story in the Swedish newspaper, > > Svenska Dagbladet, the report said that "Lotus built > >in and NSA 'help information' trapdoor to its Notes system, as the > > Swedish government discovered to its embarrassment." > > > > The report goes on to describe a feature called a > > "workfactor reduction field" that is built into Notes > >and incorporated into all email sent by non-US users of the > > system. The feature reportedly broadcasts 24 of the 64 > > bits of the key used for each communication, and relies > > on a public key that can only be read by the NSA. > > > > Lotus could not be reached for comment. > > > > The new report emerges as politicians on both sides of > > the Atlantic are growing increasingly concerned about > > Echelon and its capabilities. > > > > "I believe that it's time that there is some > >congressional scrutiny of the Echelon project and I am examining a way > > to do that," said Representative Bob Barr (R-Georgia). "I > > understand the need for secrecy -- I was with the CIA > > myself -- but Echelon has raised some questions about > > fundamental policy and constitutional rights." > > > > Barr is concerned that the NSA is using its Echelon > > partners to help it sidestep laws that forbid the US > > government from spying on its own people. > > > > So far, there has been very little scrutiny of spy > >systems in the United States, according to Patrick Poole, a privacy > > advocate and lecturer in government and economics at > > Bannock Burn College in Franklin, Tennessee. > > > > "The only significant examination of spy systems in the > > United States was the Church Report, which was > > prompted by Watergate in the early '70s," said Poole. > >"I hope that Europe's interest in the Echelon system will > > spark some new debate in the US." > > > > Echelon is believed to be principally operated by the > >NSA and its British counterpart, the Government > > Communications Headquarters. The system also > > reportedly relies on agreements with similar agencies > >in other countries, including Canada's Communications > > Security Establishment, Australia's Defense Signals > > Directorate, and New Zealand's Government > > Communications Security Bureau. > > > > > > >
[Date Prev] | [Thread Prev] | [Thread Next] | [Date Next] -- [Date Index] | [Thread Index] | [interesting-people Home]
Powered by eList eXpress LLC