IP: CBO on National Missile Defense

[Dave Farber <farber@cis.upenn.edu>]

>Date: Wed, 17 May 2000 15:50:30 -0400 (EDT)
>From: AIP listserver <fyi@aip.org>
>To: fyi-mailing@aip.org
>Subject: FYI #53 - CBO on National Missile Defense
>
>FYI
>The American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Science Policy News
>Number 53: May 17, 2000
>
>CBO Paper Questions Missile Defense Cost, Schedule
>
>When President Clinton meets with Russian President Vladimir
>Putin at a June summit in Moscow, one of the topics for
>discussion will be a US national missile defense (NMD) system,
>and possible revisions to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
>Treaty.  While the Russians have been reluctant to consider
>revising the treaty to permit US construction of such a defensive
>shield, there are also questions and concerns about the proposed
>system closer to home.
>
>As reported in FYI #52, the Council of the American Physical
>Society released an April 29 statement addressing the decision
>Clinton is expected to make this summer or fall regarding
>deployment of a National Missile Defense (NMD).  Also in April,
>the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a document on the
>"Budgetary and Technical Implications" of the planned system.
>Neither the APS statement nor the CBO paper take a position
>regarding eventual deployment of such a system.  The APS
>statement says that tests planned before the expected decision
>"fall far short" of what would be necessary to prove the
>"technical feasibility" of the system.  The CBO report arrives at
>a higher cost estimate for the first phase of the system than the
>Administration projects, and admits to ambiguity regarding the
>sufficiency of the planned number of test flights before a
>deployment decision is made.
>
>The 37-page CBO document, intended to provide "objective,
>impartial analysis," was requested by Democratic Senators Tom
>Daschle (SD), Frank Lautenberg (NJ), and Carl Levin (MI).  It
>does not attempt to "examine the ultimate effectiveness of the
>NMD system."  According to the document, recent intelligence
>reports have "instilled a sense of urgency in the Administration,
>causing it to propose a very ambitious development schedule for
>NMD."  The Administration has restructured its plan "so that
>deployment could occur in 2005 if a decision was made this summer
>to do so."
>
>According to CBO, the Administration's plan lays out three
>possible phases: Expanded Capability 1 would ultimately comprise
>100 interceptors at one launch site in Alaska, intended to defend
>against missiles with simple countermeasures.  Capability 2 would
>be able to handle more sophisticated countermeasures, and
>Capability 3 would add more interceptors and a second launch
>site, most likely in North Dakota.  The Administration has only
>given a cost estimate for Expanded Capability 1, of $25.6 billion
>through the year 2015.  CBO estimates that this first phase would
>cost $29.5 billion over the same period, and explains that its
>estimate includes more replacements and spares, more additional
>testing in the system's early years, and an assumption of 20
>percent cost growth (comparable to similar programs), rather than
>the Administration's assumption of 5 percent growth.  The paper
>also predicts greater operating costs than the Administration.
>CBO projects that moving from Expanded Capability 1 to Capability
>2 would cost an additional $6.1 billion, for a total system cost
>of $35.6 billion, and proceeding to Capability 3 would cost $13.3
>billion, bringing the total cost to $48.8 billion.  CBO notes
>that the Administration gives no cost estimates for the follow-on
>phases, and that the current defense plan for future years does
>not at this time include enough funding for those later phases.
>
>After reviewing historical testing trends for similar development
>programs, CBO concludes only that "unfortunately, the record of
>past programs is ambiguous" with respect to the appropriate
>number of test flights.  It finds, however, that the average
>development time for similar programs is 13 years rather than the
>10 planned for NMD, and warns of the "significant risks"
>associated with such an accelerated schedule.  One consequence is
>the significant overlap between development and production.  The
>document refers to the NMD program as "an extreme example of
>production overlapping development."  The closest CBO comes to
>making a recommendation is to  say that "extending the
>acquisition schedule for the threshold deployment of Capability 1
>to the more traditional 13 years - with deployment by the end of
>2008 - would have some advantages."  In particular, this would
>allow more time to develop "the technology needed to discriminate
>between decoys and real warheads."
>
>The CBO paper also addresses possible reactions by other nations
>to US implementation of a national missile defense.  Entitled
>"Budgetary and Technical Implications of the Administration's
>Plan for National Missile Defense," the paper  is available at
>http://www.cbo.gov under "Recently Released" documents.
>
>###############
>Audrey T. Leath
>Public Information Division
>The American Institute of Physics
>fyi@aip.org
>(301) 209-3094
>http://www.aip.org/enews/fyi/
>##END##########