IP: 2 on StarWars TNG: [risks] Risks Digest 21.63

[David Farber <dave@farber.net>]

>Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2001 11:44:20 +0100 (BST)
>From: Pete Mellor <pm@csr.city.ac.uk>
>Subject: The Heavens at War: NMD assessed
>
>The Heavens at War: BBC Radio 4, 28th August 2001
>Reporter and presenter: Jackie Hardgrave.
>
>Preface
>
>The following summary is based upon notes made while listening to the first
>broadcast of the programme, together with reference to the web-site (which
>does not include a full transcript).  It is as fair a summary of the content
>of the programme as I could manage.  However, shorthand is not one of my
>many talents, and I cannot claim total accuracy.  I stand to be corrected if
>I have misquoted or wrongly attributed a quotation.  I have indicated
>uncertain spellings of people's names by (sp?).
>
>I have placed my own comments in brackets: [PM: my comments] and added some
>more at the end.
>
>Please see the web site:
>http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/atoz/heavens_at_war.shtml,
>or listen to the repeat broadcast on Sunday 2nd September at 5pm (British
>Summer Time).
>
>
>Introduction
>
>The programme concerned the National Missile Defense system (NMD).  [PM: It
>used that name throughout, although the "National" has now been dropped and
>it is known as "Missile Defense System" (MDS), I believe.]  This is also
>known as "Son of Star Wars" after the nickname for the President Reagan's
>earlier Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
>
>Main question: Will the technology work or is it doomed to expensive
>failure?
>
>The threat to the US is now perceived to be from "rogue states" and no
>longer an all-out nuclear strike from Russia.  North Korea, Iran and Iraq
>were specifically mentioned.  Also, although China and Russia have
>sophisticated systems, an accidental launch is a possible threat.
>
>In 1972 only 9 nation states had the capability to launch an
>intercontinental ballistic missile.  This number has vastly increased.
>Around 1000 ICBMs were produced last year.  Their range is continually
>increasing (e.g., N. Korea has tested a missile with an intercontinental
>(IC) third stage).  There is also the possibility that the possession of
>intercontinental missiles may be used in diplomatic blackmail to deter the
>USA from some course of action.
>
>Michael O'Hanlon, a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at The Brookings
>Institution (a private institution that studies public policy), gave the
>example of Iraq launching a new but limited attack on the Kuwaiti oilfields
>in 10 to 20 years time.  If Iraq was by then capable of launching missiles
>at the USA, and a new "Desert Storm" was on the way, Saddam Hussein (or
>Uday, who might have taken over by then) would see no reason not to "play
>for keeps" and threaten to launch an ICBM attack, or actually attack a small
>city as a demonstration of what they could do.
>
>President Reagan began the original "Star Wars" -- which failed due to
>financial [PM: and technical?] reasons.  Why is "Son of Star Wars" under
>way now?  1998 was a pivotal year.  India and Pakistan both tested nuclear
>warheads.  The Rumsfeld (sp?) commission reported that a nation could
>easily develop the capability to produce nuclear warheads and then
>surprise the West by suddenly testing them.  China was suspected of having
>obtained the nuclear secrets of the USA by espionage.
>
>
>The Technical Dimension
>
>There are three phases in which to destroy an ICBM launched against one's
>territory:-
>
>1.  On first launch, before the missile has left the atmosphere.  This
>provides a very short window of opportunity, but the missile is relatively
>easily detectable by the plume of exhaust gases from the boosters or first
>stage launch vehicle.
>
>2.  In mid-course, after the missile has left the atmosphere and is
>following a ballistic trajectory through space.  This offers the easiest
>opportunity, since it is the longest phase.  During this phase the missile
>might break up, and release its warheads and "decoys" (see below) to
>follow their separate paths.
>
>3.  After reentry into the atmosphere when the missile is minutes away
>from its target.  By this stage, the missile will almost certainly have
>broken up (if it is going to do so), releasing its lethal payload along
>with its decoys.
>
>Three interception test have been conducted so far.  [PM: I believe these
>were mid-course.]  Two failed, and the third (a few weeks ago) succeeded
>[PM: but this "success" has been questioned!].
>
>NMD requires long-range interceptor missiles to destroy hostile ICBMs.  The
>interceptor releases a "kill vehicle" which homes in on, and collides with,
>the incoming ICBM.  No explosives are involved.  The concept has been
>described as a "smart rock" or a "bullet to hit a bullet".  [PM: the term
>"smart rock" cropped up in the earlier SDI also.]  A total of 250
>interceptor missiles with kill vehicles are to be deployed in Alaska and
>Florida (?).
>
>Incoming ICBMs will be detected by ground-based radar and by satellite-based
>infrared sensors.  Nine new radar systems will sort warheads from decoys.
>Satellite-based infrared sensors will assist interception in outer space.
>The problem here is that heavy objects (e.g., nuclear warheads) have the
>same trajectory as light objects.  The incoming ICBM could therefore deploy
>light weight decoys in large numbers without sacrificing range.  For
>example, decoys could be mylar balloons with aluminium coating.  Dozens of
>these could be released.
>
>In some cases, it may be necessary to launch several interceptors.
>
>Philip E. Coyle, an advisor to the Center for Defense Information (an
>independent Military Research Organisation) and until recently the director
>of Operational Test and Evaluation at the Pentagon, with responsibility for
>overseeing NMD testing, gave the "hole in one" analogy.  Hitting an incoming
>ICBM is like trying to score hole in one (you only get one shot!) on a golf
>course where the hole is moving at 15000 mph.  With decoys, this is like
>having a lot of holes with flags to aim at and having to choose the right
>one at the same time!  The problem would be very different in a real
>situation (unlike the tests conducted so far).  Not all eventualities can be
>planned for.
>
>Lisbeth Gronlund, Senior Staff Scientist of the Union of Concerned
>Scientists, pointed out that any nation that was capable of missile
>production would find the production of balloon decoys a trivial problem.
>
>The tests so far have used decoys, and in the successful test the kill
>vehicle did pick the correct target, but this was not a realistic test,
>since the "warhead" was different in appearance and temperature to the
>decoys [PM: presumably to a degree greater than that which the designers of
>a real attacking ICBM could achieve?].
>
>At least one of Coyle and Gronlund suggested that NMD will never be tested
>in realistic conditions before being deployed, since it would almost
>certainly fail!.
>
>O'Hanlon's views partly agreed with this.  NMD cannot be tested in a totally
>real situation.  However he believes that it is possible to get close to it,
>for example by not telling the "defenders" when the "hostile" missile that
>is their target is to be launched and what decoys it will deploy.  He stated
>that, although it would be a delusion to assume that 100% success could be
>guaranteed, a 95% confidence in a NMD system would be better than no defence
>at all.  [PM: See below!]
>
>The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization adopts a more bullish position: a
>solution to all of these problems will be found.  One telling quotation
>(unattributed) was: "The United States will do what the United States has to
>do!"  Anyway, the adversary will take time the prepare and test
>counter-measures, and this activity will betray itself to the intelligence
>agencies.
>
>However, there is a more serious problem if the ICBM carries a lethal
>chemical or biological payload.  Unlike a nuclear warhead, which is an
>integrated complex device, the lethal material is just "stuff".  The payload
>could divide up into twenty or more bomblets which would be released and
>would fan out over the target area.  These would all be identical in
>appearance, all real, and all lethal.
>
>Faced with this possibility, the defenders' best tactic is to strike
>immediately after launch, while there is only one target.  This requires an
>interceptor missile close to the point of launch.  In practice, this means
>on board a ship.  President Bush has approved the budget to develop this
>capability.  However, neither the ships nor the missiles they will carry
>have yet been developed, and they will not be ready for service for many
>years.
>
>Tom Colleenor (sp?) pointed out that a strike in the first stage after
>launch would allow only a minute or two to decide whether to launch the
>interceptor, which means that the decision must be taken by a field
>commander.  [PM: This has interesting political and strategic military
>implications!]
>
>For a more "Star Wars" approach the team visited Kirkland Air Force base in
>New Mexico to observe developments in a real "ray gun": the use of a laser
>beam strike against an ICBM.  Undergoing development is the Airborne Laser
>(ABL) on B747 aircraft.  This consists of four lasers, three to track the
>missile and one to kill it with a one million watt bolt of energy.  The
>attack would proceed as follows: the launch of the hostile ICBM is detected
>by infrared sensor detection (IRSD) [PM: on the aircraft or on satellite?].
>The aircraft uses its tracking lasers to get the range and bearing and locks
>on to the exhaust plume.  It then aims its large laser in the nose of the
>aircraft at the plume and tracks up to the nose of the missile and unleashes
>its energy.  The effect is not to destroy the missile in a sudden explosion,
>but to heat the fuel tanks to the extent that they develop cracks and so to
>cause a structural failure.
>
>It will take many years for this to become ready for combat.  In the
>meantime, spin-offs in smaller tactical or space-borne lasers might provide
>some returns.  [PM: Space-borne lasers were a feature of the original SDI.
>These were to be mounted on orbiting robotic "battle stations".  One
>proposal (which was the subject of actual nuclear tests) was that the gamma
>radiation from a nuclear explosion could be harnessed into a single
>collimated beam which would fry everything in its path.  A battle station
>carrying such a weapon would obviously be a "one-shot" device!]
>
>Joe Cirincioni (sp?) pointed out that, also in the meantime, the bad guys
>could develop a few simple counter-measures such as polishing the
>nose-cone to reduce absorption of radiation, spinning the missile (not as
>easy as it sounds) to avoid overheating of any one part of the surface, or
>insulating it with a coating (such as cork!) to avoid things getting too
>hot.
>
>President Bush is apparently willing to spend, spend, spend his way around
>these minor technical problems.
>
>
>The Political Dimension
>
>OK.  So what is there for us to worry about here?  Answer: Lots!  [PM: "Us"
>seemed to mean Europeans.  However, most of the worried voices on the
>programme were American, which could be good news.]
>
>NMD will breach the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty by end of this
>year if the Bush administration pursues its present course.  The pro-ABM
>argument is that the treaty achieved a stable stalemate between the two
>nuclear superpowers during the cold war by preventing either from developing
>an effective protection system from behind which to launch a pre-emptive
>nuclear strike, and that it still operates to forestall an offensive arms
>race.
>
>The opposing view was put by Senator Kyle, who argued that the ABM treaty
>was useful only in the cold war when there were only two nuclear superpowers
>and that it is no longer relevant.  He went on to argue that the treaty was
>not a cause of stability, and that the offensive arms race continued with
>the treaty in place.  In fact, it locked the superpowers into a strategy
>based on mutually assured destruction (appropriate acronym: MAD): If you
>wipe us out, we'll wipe you out, and then we'll all be dead!  This no longer
>makes sense, since there is no longer a monolithic enemy on the other side
>of an Iron Curtain.  The rules have changed, and we in the US will act in
>our interests, not Russia's nor anyone else's.  Russia cannot veto NMD, and
>indeed, the only sanction it could threaten is a renewal of an offensive
>arms race which it can no longer afford.
>
>President Putin is less than chuffed about this!  There is some hope that
>a detente might be reached around a trade-off of NMD and nuclear weapons
>reduction, but the USA is currently gung-ho for its impenetrable shield.
>
>O'Hanlon was worried that NMD might jeopardise attempts to work with Russia
>to control, stabilise, and (eventually) decommission (or at least reduce)
>its nuclear arsenal.  It still holds thousands of nuclear warheads mounted
>on ICBMs.  These constitute a hair-trigger weapon which could be aimed at
>the West in an instant.  [PM: Russia announced several years ago that its
>nuclear missiles were no longer aimed at the West.  Unfortunately, to re-aim
>them would take about as long as it takes to download the software.  How
>long did your last reboot take?  Another small point is that many of the
>weapons are in the territory of (and under the control of?) newly
>independent and politically unstable states which are ex-USSR.]
>
>O'Hanlon said that the fact that the ABM treaty is 30 years old does not
>make it a "relic".  His mortgage is 30 years old, but is still not a relic,
>and the Constitution of the United States is even older, but is still
>regarded as a useful document.
>
>He cited an interesting example.  In 1998 a "sounding" rocket launched from
>Norway was mistaken for a US attack vehicle by the Russian defences.  They
>were minutes from a retaliatory launch when the mistake was discovered.
>
>Ivan Zifrancuk (sp?), a Russian defence expert, was interviewed to give the
>Russian point of view.
>
>America's allies are also worried.  Radar bases and communications in the UK
>are needed for tracking.  The Menwith Hills installation has been the target
>of a Greenpeace protest.  [PM: The compliance of the present British
>government is remarkable, given the likelihood that the presence of tracking
>stations will make Yorkshire a primary target for America's enemies.  France
>and Germany have been more outspoken.]
>
>Phyllis Starkey MP was interviewed and stated that in her opinion NMD was a
>destabilising influence, and that the British Government should look to
>British interests
>
>O'Hanlon cited the problem of China (particularly sensitive since the loss
>of one of its fighter aircraft in collision with a US spy plane earlier this
>year).  The Bush administration has taken pains to reassure the Chinese (as
>it has the Russians) that NMD is not an offensive capability aimed at them.
>
>Unfortunately, there is a long-standing dispute over Taiwan, and in the
>medium term NMD could be capable of neutralising the effect of Chinese
>missiles.  At the last count, China had only 20 missiles capable of reaching
>American soil.  Senator Kyle stated that the USA would never tolerate a
>military take-over of Taiwan by China, and would come to its defence.  The
>existence of NMD would therefore be perceived as a threat by China, and may
>provoke an arms race with China.
>
>
>Conclusion
>
>The old competition between predator and prey, between defence and
>offence, between the baron in the castle and the besiegers using the siege
>catapult were quoted.  The difference here is that the "castle" in this
>new cycle of competition cannot be built without the expenditure of
>billions of dollars, whereas the "catapult" (the means of penetrating or
>circumventing NMD) are relatively cheap.  So where is the  money to come
>from?  Step forward the loyal, long-suffering (and notoriously
>tight-fisted) US taxpayers!  President Bush has promised to lighten their
>burden.  Is NMD consistent with this?
>
>As the programme concluded:  "The world awaits your decision!"
>
>
>   = = = = = = = = Peter Mellor:  Personal Comments = = = = = = = =
>      The Missing Dimension:  Safety, Reliability, and Software
>
>When President Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, aka
>"Star Wars"), it was intended to provide an absolutely impregnable defence
>for the USA against ICBM attack.
>
>It was widely regarded as utterly fantastical in conception, absurdly
>expensive to design and construct, impossible to test, and ineffective for
>its intended purpose.
>
>An impregnable defence must have a negligible probability of letting one
>attacking missile through.  O'Hanlon states that a "95%" confidence is
>better than no defence at all.  Where thermonuclear devices are concerned, a
>1% failure rate under mass attack means that you might as well not have
>bothered.  (I saw a bumper-sticker in California which read: "A single
>nuclear device can really spoil your day".  I agree!)  To destroy the USA,
>only four devices are required, one at each corner, in the stratosphere,
>outside US territory.  The electromagnetic pulse would cause an electrical
>potential spike which would zap every non-hardened semiconductor device in
>the country.  Eight out of every ten dollars would disappear in an instant.
>(Think about it!)  Hitler gave up on the air assault on Britain since he
>realised he could not cope with a 10% attrition rate on the raiding forces.
>Now we need a 99.9999% (or higher) attrition rate.
>
>The NMD is a cut-down version of SDI.  At least we no longer have to contend
>with the spectre of a world patrolled by ever-alert robot battle stations in
>orbit armed with thermonuclear devices to deliver collimated gigawatt doses
>of energy to anything which ascends above 50,000 feet and rail-guns firing
>several thousands of rounds per second of hypersonic projectiles at any
>suspect object in orbit.
>
>The NMD proposals are less fantastic, but perhaps the more dangerous for
>being slightly more plausible.
>
>What SDI and NMD have in common is that they are both crucially dependent
>on software for command and control.
>
>The head of software development for SDI was David L. Parnas.  Once he
>became aware that the current software development methods could not yield
>the impossibly high reliability required for SDI, he did the decent thing
>and resigned.  He did so very publicly and published his reasons for
>becoming totally disillusioned with the farcical SDI enterprise in a
>brilliant essay in which he stacked up each one of the then popular methods
>and showed why it was doomed to fail.  [As I recall, David was merely on a
>review panel, not head of development.  PGN]
>
>His resignation and essay probably did as much to scupper SDI as its
>ludicrous and exponentially increasing cost.
>
>Now, either we have solved all of the problems with developing
>high-integrity real-time embedded software in the few years since SDI was
>abandoned (and I don't believe it for a nanosecond), or we are into another
>technically infeasible and ultimately farcical project.
>
>I have seen no discussion of NMD in the safety-critical systems list
>recently, and no criticism anywhere from the reliability and safety
>viewpoint.  (It was not even mentioned in the BBC Radio 4 programme "The
>Heavens at War" that I have summarised above.)
>
>The silence is deafening!
>
>Peter Mellor, Centre for Software Reliability, City University,
>Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB
>Tel.: +44 (0)20 7040 8422  ) NOTE: Code recently changed from
>Fax.: +44 (0)20 7040 8585  )       7477 to 7040
>e-mail: Pete Mellor <p.mellor@csr.city.ac.uk>
>
>------------------------------
>
>Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2001 18:31:22 PDT
>From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com>
>Subject: SDI chief says system may not be reliable
>
>The head of the Pentagon's missile defense programs said he is not fully
>confident in the "basic functionality" of the anti-missile system that
>successfully intercepted a mock warhead in space last month.  That is why
>the next test of the system, scheduled for October, will be a replay of the
>July 14 test, with no additional complexities such as putting more decoys
>aboard the target missile, Air Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, director of the
>Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, told a group of reporters.  "It is
>still not totally comfortable for me to say that we can make the hit-to-kill
>technology work consistently, even in that simple scenario," Kadish said,
>adding later, "We still need some more reliability in there."  [Source: AP
>item, Missile Defense Chief 'Not Totally Comfortable' With Reliability of
>Anti-Missile System, 15 Aug 2001; and then, there are reports of the
>GPS-aided homing beacon that aided the tests -- even the two that 
>failed!  PGN]



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