IP: Applying The Wisdom Of The Ages To The 21st Century - Robert Kaplan

[Dave Farber <dave@farber.net>]

------ Forwarded Message
From: "Howard Butcher, IV" <hbiv@netreach.net>
Date: Sat, 6 Apr 2002 19:49:31 -0500
To: "David Farber" <farber@cis.upenn.edu>
Subject: Fw: Applying The Wisdom Of The Ages To The 21st Century - Robert
Kaplan  

Dear David,  Here is a piece that really puts the whole current world
situation into proper perspective, at least in my view.  Best, Howard


> Foreign Policy Research Institute
> A Catalyst for Ideas
>
> E-Notes
> Distributed Exclusively via Fax & Email
>
> ROBERT KAPLAN On
> APPLYING THE WISDOM OF THE AGES
> TO THE TWENTY FIRSY CENTURY
>
> April 4, 2002
>
> Robert  Kaplan   delivered  the  Fifth  Annual  Strausz-Hupe
> Lecture on  January 17,  2002,  drawing  on  his  new  book,
> WARRIOR POLITICS:  WHY  LEADERSHIP  DEMANDS  A  PAGAN  ETHOS
> (Random House, 2002).  Author of such books as BALKAN GHOSTS
> and THE  COMING ANARCHY,  Kaplan is a contributing editor of
> The Atlantic,  a fellow of the New America Foundation, and a
> former  senior   fellow  of   the  Foreign  Policy  Research
> Institute. WARRIOR  POLITICS is available to FPRI members at
> a 20 percent discount off the regular price of $22.95.
>
> The Strausz-Hupe  Lecture has been held each year since 1998
> in honor  of FPRI's founder, who was said to have introduced
> the term  "geopolitics" into the American vocabulary. Sadly,
> Ambassador Strausz-Hupe passed away on February 24, 2002, at
> age 98.    His  most  famous  work,  "Protracted  Conflict,"
> published in  1959, also  serves as the name of a collection
> of essays appearing in the Spring 2002 issue of Orbis on the
> war on  terrorism; the Orbis special issue includes Strausz-
> Hupe's  last   work,  completed   in  December   2001.   For
> information  about   the  ambassador,   visit  our   website
> (www.fpri.org).
>
>
>         The Fifth Annual Robert Strausz-Hupe Lecture
>                        ROBERT KAPLAN
>                              On
>               APPLYING THE WISDOM OF THE AGES
>                 TO THE TWENTY FIRSY CENTURY
>
>               (A summary by Trudy J. Kuehner)
>
>
> While many  see our  times as being marked by new challenges
> requiring some  new-age philosophy, in fact there is nothing
> wholly new about the issues we face: Mr. Kaplan noted that a
> framework  for  dealing  with  them  can  be  found  in  the
> philosophies developed  in ancient  Greece, Rome, and China.
> He  remarked   that  the  subtitle  he  chose  for  "Warrior
> Politics," "Why  Leadership  Demands  a  Pagan  Ethos,"  was
> chosen to  recognize the  lessons these earlier philosophies
> hold for our times.
>
> Throughout history, economic development, the rise of middle
> classes,  and  urbanization  --  i.e.,  all  the  things  we
> associate with  progress --  have  led  to  revolutions  and
> upheavals. The perpetrators of the recent suicide attacks in
> the   United    States   and   elsewhere,   like   so   many
> revolutionaries  before  them,  are  generally  children  of
> emerging middle  classes. With  the  dramatic  socioeconomic
> progress since the 1970s in countries like Indonesia, India,
> Brazil, and  Nigeria, the continued growth of the young male
> population projected  over the  next 10-15 years (especially
> in  sub-Saharan   Africa  and  the  Middle  East),  and  the
> increased urbanization  of the Middle East as water supplies
> dwindle, we  can be  sure the next decade will see a cascade
> of upheavals worldwide, Mr. Kaplan observed.
>
> But again, all of this has been dealt with in earlier times.
> The international  order  of  the  twenty-first  century  is
> complex, but  no more  so than  it was  at the  time of  the
> Peloponnesian Wars  between Athens  and Sparta,  in which as
> many as  fifty states  participated on  each side, joined in
> alliances as convoluted as those of the Cold War.
>
> One modern  student  of  ancient  philosophies  was  Winston
> Churchill. His  "River War" (1899), a narrative of Britain's
> reconquest of  the Sudan,  evidences  the  sensibilities  of
> Thucydides or  Herodotus, a  morality preceding  monotheism.
> Having become  an avid  reader of  ancient history  once  he
> experienced war  for himself, Churchill would have been well
> familiar with  the story  in the "Iliad" of the Trojans, who
> believed that  through their  prosperity they  could buy off
> enemies and ensure peace -- until they were invaded by Greek
> warriors and besieged.
>
> The lesson  for Churchill,  as for us, Mr. Kaplan stated, is
> that without  a challenge,  a great  power will descend into
> decadence and  partisanship. Britain  in the  1890s  was  an
> empire at  peace. London  was the  financial capital  of the
> world, and Britain's navy was supreme. But because it was at
> peace, it  lacked a  uniting moral struggle. Its campaign in
> the Sudan  presages the  policy battles in the United States
> in the  1990s over  Bosnia and Kosovo and the debate whether
> those interventions were in our self-interest as a nation at
> peace. Churchill  concludes that  it's through  serving  its
> self-interest that  a country shapes and improves the world.
> Britain was  pursing naked self-interest in the Sudan in the
> 1890s, and yet in doing so laid the groundwork for more than
> fifty  years   of  civil   administration  thereafter   that
> dramatically  raised   the  Sudanese   standard  of  living.
> Churchill believed  in a  morality of  consequence,  not  of
> intentions. If the results are good, then virtue attaches to
> them.
>
> Churchill also  believed that  geography  and  history  were
> things to  be acknowledged  and overcome, not denied. Both a
> realist and  an idealist,  he painted a pessimistic portrait
> of Sudan,  with its  brutal climate  and warring tribes, and
> yet he  saw the  challenges as  being ones that moral people
> could  surmount.   Indeed,  to   him,   without   evil   and
> intractability, there  could be  no good, no moral behavior,
> and no heroism.
>
> Importantly, Churchill  recognized the  paramount importance
> of patriotic  pride. A  nation without  pride in its history
> will lack  courage. Livy's  romanticization of  the  earlier
> Roman struggle  against Carthage  is mirrored in the Allies'
> subsequent romanticization  of World  War II.  The  way  the
> United States  was able  to deal  with September 11, finding
> strength and  pride in  its history, is testament to the key
> role this can play.
>
> The moral  priorities Churchill  was willing  to  establish,
> too, are  more connected to the ancient understanding of the
> need to  choose one  good over  another than  to the  Judeo-
> Christian struggle between good and evil. In foreign policy,
> leaders are often forced to choose between two goods and may
> have to  perpetrate evil to serve the greater good. The Bush
> administration's preparedness  on 9/11  to  shoot  down  the
> fourth hijacked plane if necessary shows that it understands
> this, too, Mr. Kaplan stated.
>
> There  is   often  an  ancient,  real  morality  in  states'
> relations where we might not perceive it, he went on. In his
> 1972 essay  "The Originality  of  Machiavelli,"  Sir  Isaiah
> Berlin concludes  that far from being amoral, Machiavelli is
> guided by  a definite  morality --  just not  the  Christian
> morality. Rather,  his is the morality of the ancient polis,
> the values that secure a stable community. A different level
> of morality  is required  for those  who must  take personal
> responsibility for  millions. Unlike  our religious morality
> as interpreted  in public  discourse  by  politicians,  good
> intentions  are   not   enough   for   these   leaders.   In
> Machiavelli's political and social world, if an outcome were
> unsuccessful, the act could not be virtuous.
>
> This was also observed in the 20th century by George Kennan,
> who wrote  that in foreign affairs, "other criteria, sadder,
> more limited,  more practical,  must be  allowed to prevail"
> ("Realities of  American Foreign  Policy," 1954)  and Arthur
> Schlesinger, to  whom morality  in foreign  affairs  derived
> from "one's  own  sense  of  honor  and  decency"  and  "the
> assumption that  other nations  have legitimate  traditions,
> interests, values  and rights  of  their  own"  ("Cycles  of
> American History," 1986). But they are only stating what was
> known to Machiavelli, Thucydides, and back to Aristotle, Mr.
> Kaplan noted.
>
> Machiavelli's "Prince"  is for  those who reject determinism
> and will  use any  means to  overcome their fate. Because he
> liberated politics  from the fatalism and self-righteousness
> of the  medieval church  and brought  it into  the realm  of
> self-interest, which  allows nations to deal with each other
> in mutual  respect, William Manchester named Machiavelli the
> father of  the Renaissance.  Mr. Kaplan offered the examples
> of two  recent leaders  in the  tradition  of  Machiavelli's
> "Prince": Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein I.
>
> In the  late 1980s,  it was  Rabin's hard  line on the first
> Palestinian intifada  that earned  him the political support
> which he  drew upon  later in reaching the Oslo accords. And
> when King  Hussein disbanded a Soviet-leaning, democratizing
> government in the 1950s and took strong measures to suppress
> terrorism in  the 1970s,  he knew  that he was saving Jordan
> from other,  crueler leaders.  Both adhered to Machiavelli's
> insistence on  using only  the  minimum  amount  of  cruelty
> needed and  only when it was likely to do the greatest good.
> By contrast,  because of  his excessive  cruelty, no  virtue
> attaches to  General Pinochet, even if he did make Chile the
> most prosperous Latin American country.
>
> Thucydides  wrote   that  only   three  things   govern  our
> intentions:  fear,  self-interest,  and  honor.  In  foreign
> affairs, these  should not  be denied, Thucydides explained,
> but managed  in ways  that optimize  outcomes for  the given
> nation. War is not an aberration, and the constant potential
> for it  must be  acknowledged. Similarly,  the way  to avoid
> tragedy is  to cultivate  a sense  of it. Indeed, Mr. Kaplan
> observed, it  was by  thinking tragically, envisioning "What
> can go wrong?" that our founding fathers created a nation of
> optimism.
>
> Turning to  China's traditions,  at the  time the  classical
> world  was  developing,  China  also  comprised  many  small
> kingdoms, the  larger of  which fought  with each  other  in
> various alignments.  Chinese thinkers learned the same thing
> that those  in Greece  and Rome  had: sovereignty  does  not
> occur in a void. Peoples and tribes will unite and wars will
> occur because of differences with others. The Warring States
> period led  to Sun-tzu's  "Art of  War," a  summary of their
> convential wisdom  that is  as wise  today. War represents a
> failure of  a state's  politics to  achieve  its  ends.  The
> pursuit of  pragmatic self-interest  is a moral, not amoral,
> act. Avoiding  war requires  foresight, and therefore spies;
> nations  that   do  not  appreciate  this  are  destined  to
> experience tragedies.  (This may  not have been self-evident
> before 9/11 but it certainly is now, Mr. Kaplan remarked.)
>
> The  philosopher   who  best   embodies  all  these  ancient
> sensibilities to  Mr. Kaplan  is Thomas  Hobbes (1582-1679).
> Profoundly moral,  he took  up  where  Aristotle  left  off.
> Liberal and  progressive by  the standards  of his  time, he
> rejected divine  right, introducing the idea that government
> is only  legitimate if  it serves  the  interests  of  those
> governed.
>
> Hobbes is also the first modern, moral philosopher to search
> for the roots of morality, which he traced to profound fear.
> We all  have the deep subconscious fear of suffering violent
> death at  the hands  of another  in the  dark. We will go to
> great lengths  to avoid  this, giving up part of our freedom
> to a government, or Leviathan, with the overriding authority
> to protect  us from other human beings. Our founding fathers
> certainly were  informed by  this philosophy of the ancients
> as stated by Hobbes, Mr. Kaplan said. This central authority
> and  order   must  precede   democracy.  Without  a  central
> authority to punish wrongdoers, practically speaking nothing
> is immoral. "The Federalist Papers" show their understanding
> of our  need for a central authority, but one they sought to
> make as untyrannical as possible.
>
> Hobbes could  be the  philosopher for the next twenty years,
> Mr. Kaplan  suggested. With  a number of calcified, decaying
> regimes increasingly lacking legitimacy throughout the world
> -- in  the Middle  East, sub-Saharan  Africa, Central  Asia,
> etc.  --  our  challenge  is  to  recreate  new,  legitimate
> authorities before  we can think of making those authorities
> democratic. Closer  to  home,  the  whole  debate  over  the
> attorney general's  military tribunals is Hobbesian. Reading
> Hobbes would  enrich our  understanding of  what  degree  of
> freedom we would give up for our protection.
>
> If in  the past  we have had raison d'etat, which recognizes
> the self-interest  of the  state  and  that  foreign  policy
> operates on a more limited morality than domestic policy, in
> the future,  we  will  have  raison  de  systeme,  he  said:
> recognizing the  self-interest of  the system rather than of
> the state.  We will  and should  never have  a strong  world
> government, because any world government would by definition
> lack opposition  and become  tyrannical. But  we  will  have
> eminently strong,  robust global  institutions  constituting
> world governance.  Just as individuals give up some of their
> freedoms in  favor of  protection, nations will give up some
> of their  sovereignty to  maintain order and limit the level
> and amount  of warfare  around the  word. This  is all  very
> Hobbesian: the  highest morality  will be  the  morality  of
> keeping  the   system  together,   of  moving   toward  more
> interlocking governments,  and of international institutions
> to foster  democracy. It  closes the gap between the limited
> morality of foreign affairs and the Judeo-Christian concepts
> of private  morality that  have applied in domestic law. The
> War Crimes  Tribunal and  the Hague  represent an  embryonic
> beginning of this new system of order.
>
> But one  cannot bring in a more universally democratic world
> situation without being periodically ruthless, using methods
> indefensible by universal or democratic morality, Mr. Kaplan
> concluded.  President   Reagan's  deployment   of   Pershing
> missiles in  Western Germany  in December 1983 was denounced
> by the  foreign policy  mandarinate in the United States and
> demonstrators in  Europe, but  it led  to a change in Soviet
> policy that  ultimately led  to the  collapse of  the Berlin
> Wall, and  so led to a more democratic world. There are many
> other examples: most recently, Kabul was liberated by B-52s.
> A world  of more  than 200  nations and  thousands  of  non-
> governmental organizations requires the organizing principle
> of some  great power  to move  it  toward  a  more  peaceful
> democratic future.  That great  power has  to  operate  from
> self-interest, supported  by a  people  motivated  by  their
> romanticized past,  even if  it is  emblemized by  flags  on
> pick-up trucks.  The twenty-first  century may  witness  the
> rough equivalent  of China  after the  Warring States period
> ended in  the third  century BCE.  The victorious Han empire
> governed a  loose assemblage  of states  in a  way that kept
> disagreement to  a minimum for four hundred years. The Great
> Power organizing  principle can  work when  we recognize the
> role of  patriotic pride,  a usable  past, and  methods that
> cannot be  defended by  the  religious  morality  of  public
> discourse but by an older, more limited pagan morality.
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------
> You may  forward this  email as  you like  provided that you
> send it  in   its entirety  and attribute  it to the Foreign
> Policy Research  Institute.   If you  post it  on a  mailing
> list, please contact FPRI  with the name, location, purpose,
> and number of recipients of the mailing list.
>
> If you receive this as a forward and would like to be placed
> directly  on     our   mailing     lists,  send    email  to
> FPRI@fpri.org. Include your name, address,  and affiliation.
> For further  information, contact  Alan Luxenberg  at  (215)
> 732-3774 x105.
> ----------------------------------------------------------
>
>
> FPRI, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, PA 19102-
>                            3684.
>   For information, contact Alan Luxenberg at 215-732-3774,
> ext. 105 or email fpri@fpri.org or visit us at www.fpri.org
>
>
>
>
>




------ End of Forwarded Message

For archives see:
http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/