IP: more on FBI 'Carnivore' glitch hurt al Qaeda probe

[David Farber <dfarber@earthlink.net>]

-----Original Message-----
From: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@research.att.com>
Date: Thu, 30 May 2002 00:48:37 
To: farber@cis.upenn.edu
Subject: Re: IP: FBI 'Carnivore' glitch hurt al Qaeda probe

In message <20020529222855.0C036265C9@admin.listbox.com>, "David Farber" writes
:
>Seems to they were warned. Djf

Indeed.  See, for example, the "Inside RISKS" column by myself and Matt 
Blaze (http://www.crypto.com/papers/carnivore-risks.html, CACM 10/2000),
where we said:

	First, there is the problem of extracting exactly (no more
	and no less) the intended traffic. Standard network monitoring
	techniques provide only an approximation of what was actually
	sent or received by any particular computer. For wiretaps,
	the results could be quite misleading. If a single packet
	is dropped, repeated, or miscategorized (common occurrences
	in practice), an intercepted message could be dramatically
	misinterpreted. Nor is it always clear ``who said what.''

Much of the attention has been focused on intercepting the wrong
information; this case shows that that can lead directly to failure to
intercept the right people.

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