[IP] R. James Woolsey on The War On Terrorism

[Dave Farber <dave@farber.net>]

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From: Foreign Policy Research Institute <fpri@fpri.org>
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2002 05:32:19 -0400
To: David Farber <dave@farber.net>
Subject: R. James Woolsey on The War On Terrorism

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R. James Woolsey on The War on Terrorism

October 10, 2002

This lecture,  delivered on  October 1  in Philadelphia, was
established    in     2002    by    the    Pitcairn    Trust
(http://www.pitcairn.com),  one   of  the   leading  private
investment concerns  in America.    Mr.  Woolsey  served  as
Director of  Central Intelligence (1993-95).  He has enjoyed
a distinguished  career,  both  in  public  service  and  in
private legal  practice.   His career  in government service
has included  high-level positions in two Republican and two
Democratic administrations.


                    THE WAR ON TERRORISM
        The Pitcairn Trust Lecture in World Affairs

    Summary of Remarks by The Honorable R. James Woolsey

Mr. Woolsey  began by stating his conviction that the war on
terrorism was  the successor  to the three World Wars of the
Twentieth Century (the third being the Cold War).  He agreed
with Professor  Eliot Cohen that this was a global struggle.
It would  be long  and hard but hopefully not as long as the
Cold War.

The former CIA Director then described the "enemy" (those at
war with  the United  States) an  enemy  we  did  not  fully
recognize until after September 11th.

The first consisted of the Islamist Shia that constitute the
ruling circle  in  Iran.    Their  campaign,  begun  by  the
Ayatollah Khomeini,  had already  lasted nearly  twenty-five
years and  exacted heavy  casualties,  such  as  the  Beirut
bombings (1983)  and Khobar  Towers in  Saudi Arabia (1995).
Their part  in this  war, however,  depended on  politics in
Iran, where  the Islamist  clerical regime was struggling to
maintain control.

The second  consisted of  the  fascist  regimes,  the  Baath
parties ruling in Syria and Iraq that now combined a fascist
party  structure,  originally  secular,  with  a  patina  of
Islamism.   The Iraqi  animus dated to the Gulf War a decade
ago and,  indeed, the  Gulf War had never really ended given
Saddam's violation  of the  cease-fire terms, especially his
retention  of   longer-range  rockets,   chemical-biological
weapons, and his search for nuclear capability.

The third  comprised Sunni  Islamists.   Such groups  as al-
Qaeda had  become active  against us  in the  mid-1990's and
were a  merger in a sense of long-standing movements such as
the Muslim  Brotherhood (Egypt)  and the  Wahhabis in  Saudi
Arabia.   There was  a history of such movements in the Arab
portion of  the Islamic  world, often  in  reaction  against
foreign presence:   Mongol,  Ottoman, European  or American.
The most  recent manifestation  had been  boosted since 1979
when, after Khomeini's accession in Iran and the battle over
the Grand Mosque in Mecca at a cost of 4,000 casualties, the
Saudi royals  had given  much more  license and resources to
Wahhabi activities  abroad.   Mr. Woolsey asked the audience
to imagine  the Spain  of Ferdinand  and Isabela  possessing
twenty-five  per   cent  of   the  world's  oil  and  giving
Torquemada and  the  Inquisition  license  to  spread  their
doctrines abroad,  preaching hate  for Jews,  Christians and
those who disagreed with them.

These three  groups of American enemies, somewhat like Mafia
families, hate and kill one another, but are also capable of
occasionally helping  one another  vis-a-vis us  (e.g., with
training, sanctuary, or equipment).  Probably neither of the
two governments at issue (Iraq and Iran) controlled al-Qaeda
operatives under  the old "state-sponsored terrorism" model.
Al-Qaeda is too wealthy to need to submit to that. Indeed in
Sudan and  Afghanistan, al-Qaeda had come close to achieving
"terrorist-sponsored states."  No one should be surprised to
discover links  here and  there, short  of control,  between
Iraq and  al-Qaeda. Why  are they  at war  with  the  United
States?   Mr. Woolsey  answered that  question by  quoting a
Washington, D.C.,  cab driver  who said, "They don't hate us
for what  we've done  wrong  but  for  what  we  do  right.
Freedom itself is the threat they see to their own values.

Another factor  was their  conviction that  they could  win.
Woolsey criticized U.S. policy for much of the last 25 years
in the  Middle East  for its  "kick me"  quality.   Over the
years numerous  incidents (hostages,  the  Beirut  bombings,
Saddam's survival  in 1991,  and our  largely  criminal  law
approach to  terrorism) suggested  to them  that they  could
attack the  United States  or American  friends and get away
with it.

Moreover, the  United States tended to treat the Middle East
as if  it were  a gasoline station.  We frequently looked as
if we  cared about  oil and  nothing else, certainly not the
fate of the peoples there suffering under bad governments.

Mr. Woolsey  then recited  the dismal  record  of  the  past
decade in  dealing with  Saddam, culminating  in the  end of
U.N. inspections  in 1998  and his  defiance of the Security
Council.   He quoted  former  JCS  Chairman  General  Thomas
Moorer, who  related that  Japanese prisoners of war had not
really believed  the United  States would  fight back  after
Pearl Harbor.  In this case, too, American enemies looked at
our record  and concluded  they could  win because  we  were
weak-willed.

Director Woolsey  then turned  to strategy  and  tactics  in
fighting the war at home and abroad.

At home, he saw a combination of ordinary outraged Americans
and realist  internationalists in  Washington supporting the
struggle.  But two hazards had to be avoided:  (1) excessive
abridgment of  civil liberties and (2) branding Islam as the
enemy.   Most Muslims were not Wahhabi.  Woolsey himself had
worked, when  practicing law, to obtain the release of eight
Iraqi refugees unfairly imprisoned.

Another urgent project was to protect the United States from
terrorist  exploitation   of  a  range  of  vulnerabilities,
especially  the   advanced   transportation,   energy,   and
communications networks  that made  the county work and that
had been designed without a thought to terrorism.

September 11th  was not  a "random failure."  Very smart and
very evil  men had  noticed that  we had  a  policy  of  not
resisting aircraft hijackings (assuming the plane would only
be flown  to Cuba),  that short knives were permitted aboard
aircraft, and  that cockpits  were unprotected.   We  had to
look at  each network,  such as the electricity grid, to see
where the equivalent of flimsy cockpit doors might be found.

All aspects  of U.S.  life might  be affected  both by these
needed quick  fixes  and  by  the  need  to  take  steps  to
establish resiliency in all our networks.

Abroad, Woolsey strongly recommended against military action
against Iran.   He  cited popular  demonstrations  (students
chanting "Death to Taliban in Kabul and Tehran") and growing
unrest with the Islamist mullahs, including the defection of
prominent  Ayatollahs   from  a  regime  that  violated  the
historic principles  of Shi'ite  Islam.   Woolsey concluded:
"We can't  necessarily count  on revolution soon in Iran but
nothing would  be stupider than to move militarily and drive
everyone into the arms of the fanatics."

Iraq, however,  a fascist  enemy, fully  deserved to  be the
next target.  There was no chance of popular change.  Saddam
had never  stopped the  1991 war.  His forces today are much
smaller and  less capable  than they  were in 1991 while the
United States  has even  more effective weapons.  But Saddam
was working  hard to obtain nuclear weapons to go along with
the chemical  and bacteriological ones he already possessed,
and once  he believed he could deter attacks against him, he
would resume his attempts to dominate the Middle East.

There were big risks:  Saddam might use such weapons against
U.S. forces  or try  to attack Israel, hoping for an Israeli
response that  would widen  the war.   The United States did
not have  much time  to play  out the  current U.N.-centered
diplomacy, as  a military campaign was best waged during the
winter when  U.S. troops  could wear protective gear against
chemical attack.

Finally, against  the Sunni  Islamists, Woolsey  pointed out
that the United States had always fought under the banner of
democratic ideals  and individual  liberty.  On the whole we
had done  well.   In 1917, there were but ten democracies in
the world  and today  there were  120 either  free or mostly
free states.   One-half  of the  non-Arab Muslim-predominant
states are  democracies.   So the  job could  be done.    If
American  efforts   --  they  would  have  to  be  long  and
persistent to  establish an Iraqi democracy after the Saddam
regime --  made the rulers of Saudi Arabia or Egypt or Syria
nervous, then  so be  it.   They had no reason to deny their
people basic rights.

It would  also be  vital to spread America's oil business to
other parts  of the  world (e.g.,  Russia) and to reduce our
reliance on oil generally -- more fuel-efficient cars, fuels
derived from  waste, etc.  --   so that  the  United  States
depended less  on oil  in general  and on Middle East oil in
particular.   We needed  to stop  treating  the  area  as  a
gasoline station.

Woolsey concluded  that while all of this was a big job, the
American   people   were   now   keenly   aware   of   their
vulnerability.   In the  past, we  had  acted  promptly  and
decisively to defeat our enemies.  We would do so this time,
too.

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