[IP] more on NYC to search transit riders' bags -- but ...

[David Farber <dave@farber.net>]

Begin forwarded message:

From: Michael Bacarella <mbac@netgraft.com>
Date: July 22, 2005 3:13:13 PM EDT
To: David Farber <dave@farber.net>
Subject: Re: [IP] more on NYC to search transit riders' bags -- but ...


On Fri, Jul 22, 2005 at 02:46:01PM -0400, David Farber wrote:

> Begin forwarded message:
>
> From: Rick Adams <Rick.Adams@Cello.Net>
> Date: July 22, 2005 11:42:57 AM EDT
> To: dave@farber.net, 'Ip ip' <ip@v2.listbox.com>
> Subject: RE: [IP] more on NYC to search transit riders' bags --  
> but ...
>
>
> Isn't a security policy based on random search just "we hope we get
> lucky?"
>
> Not very reassuring when phrased that way is it?

Actually, truly random searches are likely to be more effective
than searches that follow a system.

http://www.acfnewsource.org/science/random_security.html

"It turns out the best strategy is purely random (flip the coin).
Stark says this is a well-established concept in the mathematical
world, that as long as there is a detectable pattern, then it can
be exploited. This is, Stark says, the same concept behind the MIT
paper. As long as there is a pattern, your opponent can figure it
out and work against your pattern, in the case of airport security,
the pattern is whether or not your CAPPS score is high enough for
you to be pulled aside for extra security searches. But, as with
the pennies, if the pattern is purely random, you cannot know what
will happen ahead of time."

--
Michael Bacarella


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