[IP] New paper from Feldman/Halderman/Felten on Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine

[David Farber <dave@farber.net>]

Begin forwarded message:

From: Rich Kulawiec <rsk@gsp.org>
Date: September 14, 2006 3:00:06 AM JST
To: David Farber <dave@farber.net>
Subject: New paper from Feldman/Halderman/Felten on Diebold AccuVote- 
TS Voting Machine

	Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine
	Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman, and Edward W. Felten
	http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/

Abstract:

	This paper presents a fully independent security study of a
	Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine, including its hardware and
	software. We obtained the machine from a private party. Analysis
	of the machine, in light of real election procedures, shows that
	it is vulnerable to extremely serious attacks. For example, an
	attacker who gets physical access to a machine or its removable
	memory card for as little as one minute could install malicious
	code; malicious code on a machine could steal votes undetectably,
	modifying all records, logs, and counters to be consistent with
	the fraudulent vote count it creates. An attacker could also
	create malicious code that spreads automatically and silently
	from machine to machine during normal election activities --- a
	voting-machine virus. We have constructed working demonstrations
	of these attacks in our lab. Mitigating these threats will
	require changes to the voting machine's hardware and software
	and the adoption of more rigorous election procedures.

---Rsk


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