[IP] more on paper from Feldman/Halderman/Felten on Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine

[David Farber <dave@farber.net>]

Begin forwarded message:

From: Ted Kircher <tkircher@comcast.net>
Date: September 14, 2006 9:42:14 AM JST
To: dave@farber.net
Cc: Rich Kulawiec <rsk@gsp.org>
Subject: Re: [IP] New paper from Feldman/Halderman/Felten on Diebold  
AccuVote-TS Voting Machine
Reply-To: Ted Kircher <tkircher@comcast.net>

Dave,

I hope some IPer has information about potential (really inevitable)
changes via wireless updates - on election day.

Maybe we should check voters like we do passengers on airlines
for their wireless capability instead of explosives - especially during
the last hour the polls are open.

Ted
----- Original Message -----
From: David Farber
To: ip@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 6:44 PM
Subject: [IP] New paper from Feldman/Halderman/Felten on Diebold  
AccuVote-TS Voting Machine

Begin forwarded message:

From: Rich Kulawiec <rsk@gsp.org>
Date: September 14, 2006 3:00:06 AM JST
To: David Farber <dave@farber.net>
Subject: New paper from Feldman/Halderman/Felten on Diebold AccuVote- 
TS Voting Machine

Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine
Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman, and Edward W. Felten
http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/

Abstract:

This paper presents a fully independent security study of a
Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine, including its hardware and
software. We obtained the machine from a private party. Analysis
of the machine, in light of real election procedures, shows that
it is vulnerable to extremely serious attacks. For example, an
attacker who gets physical access to a machine or its removable
memory card for as little as one minute could install malicious
code; malicious code on a machine could steal votes undetectably,
modifying all records, logs, and counters to be consistent with
the fraudulent vote count it creates. An attacker could also
create malicious code that spreads automatically and silently
from machine to machine during normal election activities --- a
voting-machine virus. We have constructed working demonstrations
of these attacks in our lab. Mitigating these threats will
require changes to the voting machine's hardware and software
and the adoption of more rigorous election procedures.

---Rsk


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