[IP] more on on e-voting

[David Farber <dave@farber.net>]

Begin forwarded message:

From: Stephen Unger <unger@cs.columbia.edu>
Date: January 16, 2007 7:01:09 PM EST
To: Ed Gerck <egerck@nma.com>
Cc: dave@farber.net, ip@v2.listbox.com
Subject: Re: [IP] on e-voting

On Mon, 15 Jan 2007, Ed Gerck wrote:

> > From: Stephen Unger <unger@cs.columbia.edu>
> > Date: January 15, 2007 3:57:46 PM EST

> > ...  When did you last hear about
> > election fraud in Canada, Germany, or Sweden, for example? The
> > bottom-line argument is that there are no advantages of e-voting over
> > the manual approach that come anywhere near compensating for the  
> > great
> > increase in the likelihood of fraud and error.

> Great increase in the likelihood of fraud and error? After e-voting
> started in Brazil more than 10 years ago, with a fierce multiple
> party system making close ballot counts very common in many races,
> the total number of fraud cases affecting e-voting has been zero.

Brazil uses DRE machines made by Diebold, with no voter verified paper
audit trails. Brazilian computer experts have the same concerns about
vulnerability to fraud as are expressed in the US. Again, as in the
US, the under-the-hood nature of computer fraud is such as to make
proof of cheating extremely difficult. As discussed in the body of the
article, the absence of clear proof is not evidence that cheating is
not occurring. The fact that Brazil uses e-voting is no more of an
argument for doing so than is the fact that Michigan uses it.

> Paper ballots have a history of fraud, here and elsewhere.

That was made clear in the body of the article.

> If banking in the US would be done the same way that some people
> advocate voting should be done, you would never really be sure of your
> bank balance, and it would take you days to get it.

This is not just an apples and oranges comparison--it is more like
lemons and watermelons. Voting and banking are vastly different
processes, with little in common. I have full knowledge of every
banking transaction that I make. If the bank tried to misrepresent a
transaction, it could not be concealed from me. In an election, I have
no direct feedback indicating whether my individual vote was correctly
tallied. I can only depend on a process involving a combination of
poll watchers and poll workers. The problems involved are discussed in
the body of the article.

> Going back to paper, and exclusively to paper as some want, might be
> very profitable for those supplying the paper ballots and all that
> goes with the paper ballot system (printing, transport, storage,
> physical security, people),

Of course, e-voting machines are supplied gratis by philanthropic
companies. They are programmed for each election and maintained, free
of charge, by civic-minded technicians.
................

Stephen H. Unger
Professor
Computer Science Department
Columbia University


-------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
You are subscribed as galvin@eListX.com
To manage your subscription, go to
http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: