Begin forwarded message:
From: Ed Gerck <egerck@nma.com>
Date: April 22, 2008 10:42:18 AM PDT
To: David Farber <dave@farber.net>, Ip Ip <ip@v2.listbox.com>
Subject: Re: [IP] Shamos: Why e-voting paper trails are a bad idea
[Dave: for IP, if you wish]
Shamos is right to point out that the emphasis on a paper trail is
unjustified, even so because the need for independent auditing cannot
favor just one recording media [paper] as if it were the silver bullet.
On Aug 28, 2001, I discussed the independent auditing of DREs
without /necessarily/ adding paper media, in my talk "Voting with
Witness Voting: Qualified Reliance on
Electronic Voting", in the WOTE '01 seminar organized by
Caltech/MIT, and presented practical examples. A copy is
available at:
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/wote01/pdfs/gerck-witness.pdf
The solution does not rely only on paper, as a 'favored'
media, but on allowing multiple channels of observation,
as independent as possible, called "witnesses". It is proven,
under general Information Theory considerations, that full
channel independence is not required for the system to work.
The Witness-Voting System (WVS), without requiring paper and paper
costs, is able to prove to anyone that every vote counts. Paper
and other media can also be used. The WVS verifies whether what
the voter sees and confirms on the screen is what is actually
recorded and counted. The WVS provides any desired number of
independent records, which are readily available to be reviewed
by election officials, without ever linking voters to ballots. Even if
there would be a court order mandating everyone to reveal all secrets,
voter privacy would still prevail.
The WVS can be securely networked in a precinct, tethering a
number of voter stations to a WVS server cluster -- simplifying
certification while reducing down time, setup costs and setup time.
In particular, now that governmental and private secure record keeping
is clearly finding that paper is the least favored recording medium
specially
in regard to cost, storage, availability (in the technical IT sense),
security and survivability, it seems anachronic to have anyone
suggesting paper records as the "silver bullet" against election fraud
in DREs.
In conclusion, my comments are:
1. We should favor a technologically-neutral solution for independent
auditing of DREs, rather than postulate one particular media (paper)
over others. There are better media than paper.
2. My WOTE 2001 talk op. cit. is the first public presentation of a
practical, independent auditing solution to assure everyone that all
votes are indeed counted, without any compromise of voter privacy.
Best regards,
Ed Gerck