[IP] Re: Security clearances, lie detectors, etc.

[David Farber <dave@farber.net>]

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From: Paul Robichaux [PaulR@3sharp.com]
Sent: Friday, May 02, 2008 1:32 PM
To: David Farber; ip
Subject: Re: [IP] Re:   Security clearances, lie detectors, etc.

AIUI one key metric used in determining whether an individual should be granted a clearance is the perceived susceptibility of that individual to outside pressure. I note that the example on the list yesterday— of the publicly gay person who received a clearance— is not uncommon. Public acknowledgement of homosexuality (or, really, almost any other kind of sexual behavior) isn’t a bar to a clearance— you can’t blackmail someone for something they freely admit doing or having done.[1] T

The clearance process thus seems to focus on looking for unadmitted behaviors (gambling? Drug use? Belonging to the “wrong” organizations? Unexplained income?), on the theory that honest people will fully disclose everything to the clearance-granting authorities and thus cannot be pressured or blackmailed.

Likewise, having friends or relations in some countries, or ongoing contacts with nationals or residents of those countries, has been a basis for denying clearances based on the possibility that those relationships might be used to pressure a clearance holder.

So to turn Dr. Reed’s question around a bit, what evidence do we have that the clearance process is effective at identifying a) potential risk factors that might make it possible to subvert a given candidate and b) showing that those risk factors are really risks?

[1] Parallels to Sen. Obama’s confession of youthful drug use are left as an exercise to the reader.


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