[IP] Re: demed export -- Security clearances, lie detectors, etc.

[David Farber <dave@farber.net>]

________________________________________
From: David P. Reed [dpreed@reed.com]
Sent: Sunday, May 04, 2008 10:34 AM
To: David Farber
Cc: ip; Eugene H. Spafford
Subject: Re: [IP] demed export --    Security clearances, lie detectors, etc.

Lest it be said that I confused deemed export with security clearances,
lie detectors, etc.   I am actually a careful and perhaps smart person,
Spaf.  Unlike the people who enact the laws, I read them and try to
understand them.

My point could have been more clearly stated:  There is NO scientific
credibility to the methods used for security clearance, deciding how to
limit people from accessing technology, or detecting "lies".

The methods used by government to achieve these important goals are
bogus, and most likely are due not to careful scientific evaluation, but
to rank racism, prejudice, and ignorance, cloaked with a veil of
reason/technology that gives them some credibility.

I do share your concerns about the importance and relevance of bad
actors in the world.  But I'd ask that "security experts" police their
own ranks first.  Cast out the witchcraft and bullshit that has grown up
in the field.  Only Bruce Schneier has had the courage to make a serious
start.  The others seem to be afraid for the jobs and income.

David Farber wrote:
> ________________________________________
> From: Eugene H. Spafford [spaf@mac.com]
> Sent: Friday, May 02, 2008 10:56 PM
> To: ip
> Cc: David Farber
> Subject: Re: [IP] Re:   Security clearances, lie detectors, etc.
>
> As regards David Reed's comments...
>
> Deemed export is not the same as a security clearance.
>
> Many countries have historically had some problems of the sort where
> nationals of country A who  come to the US to study sensitive topics.
> Thereafter, they returned to country A with knowledge of technology
> that provides country A with a military or economic advantage that
> they might not have been able to develop on their own.  We can't
> prosecute them for espionage, because the material they learned was
> not classified -- merely advanced, with strong dual uses.   We can't
> charge them with theft of trade secrets (even if they were) because
> country A won't extradite them on those charges.
>
> So, the countries ("B") have developed "deemed export" rules, and
> groups of countries have treaty and other joint rules about sharing
> and not sharing various technologies.  Many "western" countries are
> signatory to the "Wassenaar Arrangement" for instance.
>
> So, we have also had cases where citizens from country A go to country
> C, get permanent residency or citizenship, then go to country B to
> learn the advantages.  They then return to country A with the
> knowledge.  Because the rules of deemed export only apply to current
> citizenship status in many countries (such as the U.S.), if country C
> is "friendly" the subterfuge might not be caught.
>
> Now, there are many issues associated with this, such as which
> countries to be concerned with, and what technologies are involved.
>
> But, there is a real problem here, with real cases, and the espionage
> goals of various countries is a matter of public record.
>
> The "country of birth" restrictions sweep up people who are political
> refugees, who were born (and left) a country that later had a regime
> change that resulted in them falling from favor as a trusted country,
> and who are legitimate immigrants.
>
> Unfortunately, no simple solutions.
>
> (And rather than repeat earlier material, I had written about use of
> lie detectors for security clearances in one of my old blog posts: <http://peek.snipurl.com/lie-d
>  >.)
>
>
> -------------------------------------------
>
>

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